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SADAT

Erdoğan’s Private Army

Report edited by

Sound of Silence Group

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The course of the history is full of stories of the dictatorial leaders, who spent their lives in order to grip total power and build a lasting reign. The dictators, like Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seem determined to keep the legacy of their predecessors even in the 21st Century. One of the main characteristics of the dictatorial leaders is that they use all the means available to them to reach their goals, disregarding ethics and legitimacy. Erdoğan stick to the rule! His tools extend from a robust media propaganda machine to multiple paramilitary organizations. His media machine, for example, functions as a fabrication mechanism, which continually attacks the opposition and spreads hatred against them. On the other hand, his paramilitary organizations are geared to confront any kind of domestic or foreign opposition via asymmetrical ways, including terrorism. Among Erdoğan’s multiple paramilitary organizations, SADAT is the most prominent and the powerful one.

SADAT (International Defense Consulting, in Turkish Uluslararası Savunma Danışmanlığı) officially describes itself as a ‘Private Defense and Consultancy Company’. Its self-description and mission statement are blurry and vague:

“SADAT Inc. is the first and the only company in Turkey, that internationally provides consultancy and military training services at the international defense and interior security sector”

“SADAT Inc. aims at establishing the cooperation among the Islamic Countries in the sense of military and defense industries, in order to assist the Islamic World to take the rank it deserves among the Super Global Powers as a self-sufficient military power, by submitting them the services regarding the organization of Armed Forces, defense consultancy, military training, and ordnance.”

Erdoğan administration prefers to keep SADAT out of any legal or administrative inquiry. This deliberately unframed mission statement allows SADAT to freely pursue Erdoğan’s ambitions. Thus, SADAT is an unsupervised, uncontrolled, unaudited paramilitary company, operating under no regulation. Erdoğan employs SADAT, alongside with other paramilitary organizations, to serve his covert agenda in and out of the country. Substantial indications show that SADAT adopts a Salafist–Jihadist ideology. There are serious claims about SADAT, which range from providing weapons and guerilla training to Salafist–Jihadist Al Nusra, Al-Qaeda and ISIL militants to establishing a pro–Erdoğan Salafist–Jihadist militia in Turkey and abroad.

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3 Ibid
One major act of SADAT was its role in Erdoğan’s self-coup on 15 July 2016. Substantial evidence indicates that SADAT and other pro–AKP (Justice and Development Party, in Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) paramilitary organizations, including mafia gangs, were responsible for some of the civilian killings. While calling the events of 15 July “a gift from God”, Erdoğan used these killings as a pretext to carry out his historically brutal crackdown. SADAT’s employment method on 15 July 2016 was an illustration of Erdoğan’s determination to use this crucial apparatus in the future to shape politics, crush political opponents and even fuel a civil unrest when he sees a necessity to protect his reign. (A substantial study on 15 July 2016 by former Turkish officials is available online.)

Following 15 July 2016 events, Chairman of SADAT Adnan Tanrıverdi was appointed as the Chief Consultant to Erdoğan. This allowed Tanrıverdi to dramatically influence the politics in Turkey. His ideas are practically driving the country while consolidating Erdoğan’s reign and tyranny. Tanrıverdi’s vision for the Military is well reflected in the new recruitment policy and the restructuring of the Turkish Military. The Military gradually drifts toward a Salafist–Jihadist ideology. Tanrıverdi’s prospect for the state structure was realized by a controversial Referendum on 16 April 2017, which was conducted in the midst of vote fraud and breach of election law by Erdoğan and his supporters. As a result of the Referendum, Turkey turned its direction from democracy to tyranny.

Erdoğan is accelerating the country towards a dangerous cliff. The Turkish nation must act immediately and resolutely to stop Erdoğan and revert the country back to rule of law and democracy. The international community should act decisively to stop the Dictator and prevent him further degrading international peace and stability. Appeasing Erdoğan would only encourage this 21st Century dictator to follow the footsteps of his predecessors. It will serve as a favor for an inevitable disaster, which naturally would not be limited to Turkey but the whole region.

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5 https://15julyfacts.com/
THE ‘BIG BOSS’ AND HIS NEED FOR SADAT

Erdoğan’s Thirst for Power and His Lasting Paranoia

Throughout his political life, Erdoğan used historical and religious rhetoric to communicate his covert political agenda. He knows how to mask his aspirations behind religious entitlements, such as the title of ‘the Caliph of All Muslims Worldwide’. He publicizes this title as a bequest from Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Long before founding his party AKP, Erdoğan took part in the circles of the National Youth Movements, which are dedicated to the idea of political Islamism, embellished with the cravings for the reminiscences of Ottoman era. There he developed skills for influencing religious people. Erdoğan builds his propaganda upon the experience from those times. In 2011 for example, referring to the conflict in Syria, he publicly mandated that he was going to perform his Friday prayer in the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, implying that the prayer would take place after the conquest of the city by his ‘Caliphate Army’. Another example of his propaganda is his showy palace. As an illusionary symbol of ‘magnificent Ottoman times’, he built a palace with 1,100 rooms, 30 times greater than the White House, on the outskirts of the Turkish capital.

Erdoğan is a master manipulator of conservative sentiments entrenched in the vast segments of the Turkish society. Based on these sentiments, Erdoğan built and consolidated an egocentric political propaganda machine. One major part of this machine is the ‘White Youth Movement’ (AK Gençlik Hareketi), which constitutes AKP’s operatives, who unconditionally advance the ‘Reis’ (the Boss which stands for Erdoğan) figure within the public. They, in return, are remunerated by the party in many ways, including state posts and salaried journalism. ‘White Youth Movement’ often serves as an incubator for Turkish public officials, making it especially powerful in the political sphere. Amongst its tasks is directing a massive trolling in the social media, which defends and advocates Erdoğan’s policies publicly, sometimes to an extent, where the opponents are grimly confronted. Another major part of this political machine is AKP’s Political Academy, where he cultivates

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6 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-coup-ataturk.html?_r=0
8 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christos-terzides/the-caliphate-of-sultan_b_11430874.html
12 http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/12/24/370931835/turkeys-president-and-his-1-100-room-white-palace
14 https://www.ft.com/content/c47ee706-1dc3-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7ff29c
15 https://www.ft.com/content/c7fb203a-79b2-11e6-97ae-647294649b28
his ideology through an institutionalized process.\textsuperscript{17}

Climbing up the political echelon step by step and eliminating his opponents one by one, Erdoğan came to a point where he emerged as the single most dominant figure practically single voice left in the country. Prior to July 15, 2016, he was just short of one main component: an ultimately loyal Military. Despite pruning the historical powers of military prowess over years through overt and the covert operations, he lacked the loyalty of this essential component. Especially a new generation of generals as well as a very large young officer cadre in the Military was his major concern since these were well known for their open-minded, pro-democracy and secular tones. Erdoğan strongly believed that such a stance by the generals and officers posed an existential menace for him, at least, in his paranoiac mentality, haunted by the reminiscence of coups in country’s history.

What made things worse for him was the recollection of ‘2013 Gezi Parkı Protests’, which came as growing waves of demonstrations. The protests originally initiated due to the concerns over Erdoğan’s negligence of the environment and then turned into mass protests against his increasing authoritarianism, a substantial demand for more freedom.\textsuperscript{18} His perceived the risk of a military coup d’état as well as a popular and decisive movement against his increasingly authoritarian regime as existential threats to his dynasty. Erdoğan felt fangless in the face of such threats against his reign, given the lack of a counterweighing force at his disposal. SADAT was the remedy.

\textbf{A Private Army for Erdoğan’s Fake Caliphate}

There are structural imperatives for cooperation between ‘Reis’, an alias used by Erdoğan’s followers, meaning ‘the Boss’ in English, and SADAT. SADAT is the plural form of the word ‘Seyyid’, which literally means ‘the Big Boss, Patron, Grand, and Chief’ in Arabic.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the term SADAT is associated with ‘the Army of the Boss’ (Reis’in Ordusu). The company limits its mission to establish a defensive cooperation amongst Muslim countries with the purpose of placing Muslim World in a position it deserves among super powerful states.\textsuperscript{20} Mission statement sounds more like a targeted business strategy crafted for particular clients, who might be keen on (or appear to be) restoring the reputation of Muslim World. Not surprisingly, Erdoğan is the prominent client, who is ultimately interested in advancing his own benefits under the mask of helping Muslim populations and countries.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item http://www.siyasetakademisi.org
\item http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/world/europe/police-attack-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square.html
\item http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=370040&idno2=c370030
\item http://www.sadat.com.tr
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
SADAT, the Defense and Consulting Company, was founded in 2012. The chairman is Adnan Tanrıverdi. Tanrıverdi was a former Army Brigadier General, whose further promotion was interrupted in the Army via a forced retirement in 1997 for allegedly harboring extremist religious agenda. SADAT’s core staff comprises hundreds of retired military personnel from various backgrounds, ranging from special operations to intelligence. They are mostly dismissed from the Turkish Military in the 1990s for their alleged extremist leanings. The two prominent civilian advisors of SADAT Abdurrahman Dilipak and Ahmet Varol are crucial since they are at the same time pro–Erdoğan journalists, who extremely advocate Erdoğan’s ideas. They both write at the pro–Erdoğan ‘Yeni Akit’ newspaper.

Figure 1 The list from the organization’s initial website shows Dilipak and Varol as advisors to SADAT. SADAT later removed staff lists from its website.

SADAT was established to give training to the staff of foreign armed forces. Its area of interest covers all Muslim populations and can clearly be seen in the company’s logo.

Figure 2 SADAT’s logo depicts its area of interest.

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22 http://www.sadat.com.tr
In one of his TV speeches, Tanrıverdi stated that SADAT was established in coordination with the members of the Government from the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi–AKP) and officials from various ministries. He even stated in a TV interview that Erdoğan directed SADAT’s foundation.

At the time of SADAT’s foundation, the Turkish legal and executive systems lacked the proper legal framework and an effective control mechanism for such an organization. This gap has never been addressed by the AKP Government deliberately. This naturally provided ideal conditions for SADAT to avoid judicial or administrative scrutiny while freely improvising its mission statement, recruitment, and activities. Upon SADAT’s foundation in 2012, the opposition parties and media raised serious concerns for its suspected mission to serve as an illegal apparatus of Erdoğan. There have been many parliamentary queries probing the Turkish Government on these claims. For example, Ali Rıza Öztürk, a Member of Parliament (MP) from the center–left Republican Peoples’ Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi–CHP), officially questioned the Turkish Government about SADAT’s involvement in training and equipping extremists and terrorist groups, including ISIL in Syria. The Government has yet to respond satisfactorily to the questions.

Below are some of the headlines from Turkish media related to SADATS’s foundation

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and activities.

Figure 4 Some examples of headlines about SADAT’s foundation. Clockwise from top left: **Aydınlık**: Counter-Guerrilla Center Approved by the Ministry, **Gündem**: SADAT, Reis’s Parallel Army? **Taraf**: New Turkey’s Gladio Farm **Cumhuriyet**: Black Hole SADAT.
LEGALITY OF SADAT

Lack of Legal Basis

The Private Military Companies (PMCs) make business by providing combat, non–combat, and security services.\(^2^6\) Whether their role might be trespassing some domestic and international law is yet controversial.\(^2^7\) As mercenaries are prohibited by UN convention, the discussion on how to define PMC operatives’ role in combative context is lasting. However, the legitimacy of PMCs is not per se the argument of this analysis. It is here mentioned just to give a general sense of what they are and how they are perceived.

On its official website, SADAT shows the regulations concerning its foundation.\(^2^8\)

— 5202 Defense Industrial Safety Law
— 5102 Law on the Control of Industrial Facilities Producing Combat Vehicles&Equipment; and Weapon, Ammunition and Explosive Materials with War Tools and Equipment
— 6136 Law on Fire arms, Knives, and Other Instruments
— Defense Industry Security Regulation

These listed regulations do not cover the services that SADAT provides. In Turkish legislation, there is no regulation for ‘Defense Service Sector’.

In response to inquiries of legitimacy, on 27 June 2012, SADAT announced that the organization performed the following steps in order to be audited:\(^2^9\)

SADAT prepared the Facility Security Certificate (Tesis Özel Güvenlik Belgesi—TOGEK), which will form the basis of inspection of the Defense Industry Service Sector and applied to MSB (National Defense Ministry, in Turkish Milli Savunma Bakanlığı)and requested that the defense industry service sector be included in the two laws (5201 and 5201) regulating the defense industry legislation. SADAT prepared draft legislation for this purpose. However, Technical Services Division of MSB sent a written response to the company stating that the Defense Industry Service Sector was not subject to any legislation in Turkey and they had no supervision task. In the end, all these efforts could not be concluded because of the famous Gezi Olayları in 2013.

\(^{28}\) http://www.sadat.com.tr/tr/hakkimizda/mevzuatimiz.html
Quotation below is SADAT’s response to, what they call, a ‘scribbling media campaign’ against their legitimacy;³⁰

“SADAT is an incorporated company, which is established in accordance with the provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code numbered 6102 and published in the Trade Registry Gazette. It was fulfilled in accordance with the establishment procedures of Incorporated Companies.”

The company stated that the Government would provide the criteria on how the consultancy, training and equipment services will be provided and how they will be audited. ³¹ It is yet not clear if these criteria have been endorsed by the Government. Milli Savunma Bakanlığı–MSB (in English National Defense Ministry) has once replied to a SADAT inquiry on auditing, saying “We (MSB) have no auditing responsibility or task”. SADAT states that they tried to coordinate with the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of National Defense and “those relevant ministries did not prevent or reject the establishment of the company!”

SADAT claims that they have not provided any training services to any country or group, on any subject or any matter, since the day of its foundation. The company further claims that it does not have any training facilities or camps in Turkey or elsewhere and it did not conduct any activities in Turkey or abroad, contrary to the Turkish law or international law. SADAT also denies connection with ISIL and with any other terrorist organization whatsoever.

There is an old proverb “where there’s smoke, there’s fire”. The Company’s commercials, ads, and brochures tell completely vice versa. Apparently, SADAT is not a charity organization. SADAT’s most ambitious area is irregular warfare; i.e. guerrilla and counter–guerrilla training. SADAT informs that those involved in the training will be experts in ambush, raids, kidnapping, assassination, sabotage, guerrilla action, street movements and secret actions.³² The legitimacy, supervision, and audit of SADAT are very troublesome. The fundamental questions below have never been answered:

— “What authority does SADAT operate with?
— Can SADAT explain which services it offers on the site, where and for what price?
— As the proposed legislation change has not been accepted yet, are the ‘services’ that should typically be monopolized by the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement units, not only unaudited but also unauthorized?
— Would it be welcomed that such PMCs as Blackwater and Executive Outcomes were also involved in the defense industry?

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³⁰ http://www.haksozhaber.net/fethullahci-ve-sol-medyanin-lincine-karsi-sadat-a-sden-aciklama-geldi-79396h.htm
³¹ http://www.sadat.com.tr
— Are weapons used ‘unregistered’?
— Are those retired members of the Turkish Military directly or indirectly involved in crimes, not even committed by many international terrorists?”

In Turkey, there are certain laws, codes, regulations, and communiqué concerning the activities of the international defense industry. Legitimization of SADAT’s establishment does not exist at all. Its activities are not audited by the Ministry of National Defense or Ministry of Trade. The company functions unsupervised, uncontrolled, unaudited. Organizations as such constitute a serious crime both in international law and normally under Turkish law.

**The Government’s Seclusion on SADAT**

Many in Turkey and abroad raised suspicions about SADAT. Severe mistrust and suspicion remain against its activities. SADAT’s activities were brought to Parliament’s agenda with several inquiries, submitted by opposition parties, but the Government declined to respond to any of them. Since 2012, CHP parliamentarians have posed many questions about the activities of this company. Below are the records:

- CHP Zonguldak **MP Ali İhsan Köktürk** – 6 Sep 12
- CHP Mersin **MP Ali Rıza Öztürk** – 5 Sep 12
- CHP İstanbul **MP Osman Korutürk** – 14 Sep 12, 16 Jan 13
- CHP Hatay **MP Refik Eryılmaz** – 3 Oct 12

For instance, one MP from the Main Opposition Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi–CHP), Ali Rıza Öztürk, directed questions to the Turkish Government regarding the claims about SADAT’s involvement in training and equipping Salafist–Jihadist extremist and terrorist groups including ISIL in Syria. In his inquiry, he asked whether the refusal of MPs request to inspect a military training camp in the Hatay province of Turkey is related to SADAT’s armed training activities there. The Government’s response to the questions was far from being explanatory and satisfactory. Below is the official query directed by Öztürk to then the Prime Minister Erdoğan.

34 [http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-10381s.pdf](http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-10381s.pdf)
36 [http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-10381s.pdf](http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-10381s.pdf)
None of those inquiries were replied. The Government stays in a strange seclusion about SADAT. There is no official statement on which irregular warfare (counter–guerrilla) training has been provided to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al Nusra, Al Qaeda and even ISIL militants, during the Syrian civil war. Whether SADAT has received a loan or a grant from the Government is not known. Whether SADAT has been supported by a foreign government and whether their activities and financial accounts are audited is not addressed at all.  

ERDOĞAN, SADAT, AND TERRORISM

American academician David L. Phillips, in an article, collected the allegations concerning Erdoğan’s and AKP Government’s ties with ISIL. Those allegations either appeared on the Turkish/international media or voiced by the opposition parties in Turkey. The allegations comprise:

- Supporting ISIL financially through purchase of oil
- Providing military equipment to ISIL
- Providing transportation and logistical assistance to ISIL fighters
- Providing training to ISIL fighters
- Offering medical care to ISIL fighters
- Assisting ISIL recruitment
- Sending Turkish military personnel to fight alongside ISIL
- Helping ISIL in Battle for Kobani
- Sharing the same worldview with ISIL

While this report addresses most of the above bullets, this section analyzes the subject in two folds: ISIL Oil and military support to ISIL alongside with other terror groups.

Erdoğan and ISIL Oil

There are serious accusations in the media about Erdoğan’s and his family members’ ties to ISIL and other terrorist groups. Russian Diplomat and Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin wrote a letter, dated 01 February 2016, to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), expressing these claims.

The letter explained how ‘illegal trading in hydrocarbons by ISIL’ was taking place. The document stated that most hydrocarbons extracted from ISIL–controlled areas are channeled through Turkey and gave details of the participants of the oil trade;

Most hydrocarbons are shipped through Turkish sea terminals on the Mediterranean coast, mainly the seaport of Ceyhan, 415 km south–east of Ankara. Transportation

38 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html
40 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aydoaean-vatanda/russian-letter-to-unsc-cl_b_9502784.html
41 http://www.voltairenet.org/article191990.html
42 https://tr.sputniknews.com/rusya/201604011021899203-rusya-bm-turkiye-isid/
44 http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/erdogan-ispat-edildigi-anda-ben-bu-makamda-duramam_b14rj9eQH0SXDT9mAFexbw
includes the use of tankers from **BMZ Group Denizcilik ve İnşaat A.Ş.**. The company was founded in 2013; its registered capital totals approximately US$ 1 million and its office is located in Istanbul at 3 Gürgen Street in the Üsküdar district. The company’s fleet consists of five tankers: Mecid Aslanov, Begim Aslanova, Poet Qabil, Armada Fair and Armada Breeze.

Russia’s letter to the UNSC also added;

The Turkish company **Powertrans is a part of Çalık Holding A.Ş.**. Its Director–General is **Mr. B. Albayrak**, is reported to be involved in the oil trade with ISIL.
BMZ stands for Bilal–Mustafa–Ziya. The company has three partners; Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan, his brother Mustafa Erdoğan, and his brother-in-law Ziya Ilgen. Chairperson of BMZ’s Board of Management is Mustafa Erdoğan.

Bilal Erdoğan’s BMZ, through the purchase of many tankers, expanded its fleet with an incredible speed, rendering him a very reach businessman in a very short time. Below is the İstanbul Trade Chamber record of Bilal Erdoğan’s companies, as of December 2015.

![Figure 8 Left, Bilal Erdoğan. Center, Mustafa Erdoğan. Right, Ziya Ilgen with Erdoğan.](image)

- Of note, after many inconsistent statements Erdoğan claimed that he first heard the coup-attempt on 15 July 2016 at 21:30 with a phone call from his claimed brother-in-law Ziya Ilgen.
- http://islamicjusticeanddevelopment.blogspot.de/2014/12/sehzade-bilalin-gemileri-sfrlanamayan-1.html

![Figure 9 The companies, which belong to Bilal Erdoğan.](image)
According to the letter, **Powertrans** is the other major company, which took an important part in trading ISIL oil. The owner of the company is **Ahmet Çalık**. He is one of Erdoğan’s close partners, especially with his media outlets. Then, the director of Powertrans was **Berat Albayrak**, Erdoğan’s son–in–law. Albayrak’s facilitation of the trade of ISIL oil through Powertrans has been reported in the media multiple times. Later in November 2015, Berat Albayrak was appointed as the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources with Erdoğan’s directive.

Albayrak’s emails related to Powertrans have even been hacked and revealed.

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59 http://romanyahaber.com/2016/10/05/cumhuriyetten-berat-albayraka-sorular/
SADAT Recruits and Trains Terrorists

In accordance with an agreement between Turkish and U.S. Governments, as from May 2015, Militaries from both countries provided military training to the fighters of Free Syrian Army (in Turkish Özgür Suriye Ordusu) in Kırşehir, Turkey. This training did not suffice Erdoğan for he wanted was that the Turkish Military directly intervened in the Syrian conflict to expedite toppling down Bashar al-Assad regime. His adventurous ideas were professionally and intellectually confronted by many generals and staff officers since the political and military objectives of such an operation were not ambiguous and they were suspicious of Erdoğan’s expansionist and non-transparent aspirations. Moreover, these military officials were against Erdoğan’s brutal crackdown on the Kurdish population during the fight against PKK. They were also in favor of economic and social measures alongside with security measures in the South East.

SADAT’s proposition came in handy as Erdoğan desperately needed a way of directly intervening in Syria at a time when he had difficulty convincing the Turkish Military. In an effort to show off his merits for the ‘Caliphate’ to his audience, both at home and abroad, he tasked SADAT and the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı–MIT, led by a former non-commissioned army officer, Hakan Fidan) to train foreign fighters, assist them to transit to the combat zones, and funnel illegal military aid to Syrian opposition groups, including ISIL and Al–Nusra Front. The military aid packages were comprised of trucks loaded with weapons, some of which were caught in Adana province of Turkey while

64 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/296432_/Devlet_ili_yapiyorduk_,html#
65 http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/sadat-isil-liileri-egitti-mi-128090.html
unlawfully smuggling weapons into Syria.\textsuperscript{69} \textsuperscript{70} SADAT, in close cooperation with MİT, trained terrorist fighters from Al Nusra and ISIL for Syrian War, utilizing non–registered weapons, neglecting international law of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{71} SADAT’s training activities comprised conventional/unconventional war and counter–guerrilla training, along with supplying weapons, equipment, explosives.\textsuperscript{72} \textsuperscript{73} \textsuperscript{74} ISIL terrorists have been trained at different training camps in Hatay, Turkey, and in Idlib and Rakka, Syria.\textsuperscript{75}

What makes SADAT even more threatening is its role in Central Asia and in Europe. SADAT is accused of recruiting in Central Asia and in Europe for the terrorist groups in Syria. The trainees came from countries including Azerbaijan, Russia (Chechnya), Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{76} \textsuperscript{77} SADAT allegedly provided them training and logistics and transferred them to Syria through Turkey to fight for ISIL and Al Nusra.\textsuperscript{78} According to a left–leaning Turkish website, in 2015 Russia conducted an investigation on 889 foreign fighters, who traveled to Syria and Iraq from Russia. The investigation revealed that 25 percent of these fighters had connections with SADAT.\textsuperscript{79} More shockingly, SADAT was supported by official Turkish representatives in foreign countries, which locally orchestrated the organization’s illegal activities. Based on the information gathered from the returning fighters, most of whom are recruited from Central Asian countries; Turkish Consulates in Russia are believed to have provided Turkish passports to the Caucasian fighters through SADAT.

According to Yordanov, a retired soldier, from the Russian military, SADAT, in collaboration with ISIL and Al Nusra, utilized three training camps in Turkey and Syria for these fighters. Yordanov’s findings were the result of the investigations into Salafist–Jihadist group members seized in Russia. He states that Russia provided a large file to the United Nations Security Council, which covered illegal international activities of Erdoğan and his private army SADAT. The file also addressed how Erdoğan utilizes SADAT as a blackmailing mechanism to put pressure on Russia, China, and European Union (EU) countries.\textsuperscript{80}

The fighters from Caucasian countries do not only operate in Syria but also target other countries, specifically Russia and European states. After fighting for ISIL and Al Nusra, these fighters are reorganized for missions such as destabilizing Russia.\textsuperscript{81} The recent terror attack in St Petersburg Metro in Russia was allegedly conducted by Akbarzhon Jailov, a

\textsuperscript{69} http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/mit-tirlari-haberine-muhalefetten-tepkii-29144868
\textsuperscript{70} http://t24.com.tr/haber/adanada-3-tir-durduruldu-arama-yapilıyor,246707
\textsuperscript{71} http://www.halkinbirligi.net/sadat-reisin-ordusu/
\textsuperscript{72} http://www.sadat.com.tr/
\textsuperscript{73} http://www.ulusal.com.tr/gundem/sadat-in-ilginc-ilani-h31842.html
\textsuperscript{74} https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/11/25/erdogans-secret-army-threat-nato/
\textsuperscript{75} http://halkinkurtulusu.net/?p=8547
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid
\textsuperscript{77} http://www.aei.org/publication/has-sadat-become-erdogans-revolutionary-guards/
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid
Kyrgyzstan–born Russian citizen who lives in Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan. This is a region, which is primarily populated by ethnic Uzbeks and where hundreds of people set out to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq.82 Jailov was also reported to have traveled to Turkey.83 In addition, the arrest of six people from the Central Asian origin by Russian investigators raised suspicion that extremists, recruited by SADAT, may have played a significant role in the terror attack in St Petersburg, Russia.84

SADAT allegedly conducts activities in Europe similar to the ones in Central Asian countries. The organization’s partner in Europe is the Union of European Turkish Democrats–UETD (in Turkish Avrupalı Türk Demokratlar Birliği). UETD is a ‘so–called’ civil society organization, operating across Europe. In fact, the union only admits pro–Erdoğan individuals to its membership.85 It allegedly helps SADAT recruit foreign fighters from European countries for terrorist groups, including ISIL and Al Nusra. UETD re–tasks SADAT recruited or trained terrorists in several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden and provides them Turkish passports.86 The most recent terror attacks in Europe cast doubts about the SADAT’s and UETD’s activities and their role in terror attacks in Europe. Although Aydınlık articulated SADAT’s structures, relations, and illegal activities well, Erdoğan and AKP Government took no action protected their ‘Private Army’.

Figure 12 Left, Aydınlık, dated 03 September 2012, states that SADAT trains opposition groups in Syria.87 Right, Aydınlık, dated 04 September 2012, reveals SADAT’s ‘Ulaşlı’ training camp for Syrian fighters in Gölcük/Izmit, Turkey. ‘Ulaşlı’ was a former Navy camp.88 89 90

82 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-blast-metro-investigation-idUSKBN1770ZT
83 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-bomb-metro-idUSKBN17A0RI
84 Ibid
85 http://halkinkurtulusu.net/?p=8547
86 Ibid
87 https://tr-tr.facebook.com/UUMANITURKLERKULUBU/posts/474479482571145
88 http://aliserdarbolat.blogspot.de/2014/07/turkmenlerin-kan-tayyipin-ellerinde.html
89 http://aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/14979-isci-partisi-sadati-basti.html

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SADAT has also involved in **Libyan crisis** for a long time. Infiltration by Tanrıverdi and his men into Libya probably dates back to 2011, even before SADAT’s foundation. SADAT provided military training to the Libyan jihadists. Head of SADAT, Tanrıverdi, visited Libya many times, met renegade former Libyan officers and enjoyed diplomatic reception by the **Turkish Embassy in Tripoli**.

**Figure 14** Tanrıverdi during one of his visits to Libya.

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92 http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/ak-ordu-ve-ak-emniyet-suphesi-124586.html
Is Erdoğan Using ‘Weapon of the Weak’?

“Europeans across the world will not be able to walk the streets safely if they keep up their current attitude towards Turkey.”

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

It is counterintuitive to assume that coincidences drive international relations since states in international relations are rational actors and they accordingly make their moves, taking all possible pros and cons into consideration. Especially for ruthlessly pragmatic politicians like Erdoğan, who are willing to take every possible step to further consolidate their power, coincidence is probably a negligible term.

A terror attack in Brussels took place on 22 March 2016. Four days before the attack, Erdoğan warned Belgium to prohibit PKK’s propaganda activities and said:

“There is no reason why the bomb that exploded in Ankara cannot explode in Brussels or in any other European city”.

Not surprisingly, Erdoğan’s Government and the Turkish newspapers controlled by Erdoğan celebrated the attack and called it “the punishment of Belgium”.

At another instance, during a meeting with the members of the Anatolian Published Association, held between 12:00–15:00 PM, on 22 March 2017, Erdoğan threatened Europeans and stated that their security will be in danger as long as their Governments will not change their attitude toward Turkey. Below is his verbatim statement:

“Europeans across the world will not be able to walk the streets safely if they keep up their current attitude towards Turkey.”

Erdoğan’s threat to the Europeans at his meeting ‘coincided’ with the terror attack against civilians in front of British Parliamentary building in London. The attack took place the same date and at the same time (14:35 PM).

One may question why Erdoğan would use SADAT and terrorism as foreign policy tools against European countries. In recent years, Erdoğan has been gradually isolated from the

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99http://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/son-dakika-haberi-ingilterede-parlamento-binasi-onunde-teror-saldirisi/jqy0IL2Y3U6cg7xtfMP%6w
West camp as he has been heavily criticized by Europe and the US due to his ruthless authoritarian tendencies and immense pressure against people opposing his policies. Erdoğan does not want to hear any criticism from US or European countries due to his authoritarian character and wants to use state repression freely at home. Erdoğan’s options against Europeans are limited. He is much aware of the fact that Turkey’s neither economic nor political influence can convince European countries to keep silent against Turkey’s slide into a non-democratic regime, which fundamentally contradicts fundamental humanitarian values. The Turkish economy is consistently deteriorating and becoming vulnerable to a serious economic crisis. In fact, Erdoğan needs Europe because European countries are major trading partners of Turkey and have substantial investments in the country. Given the trade imbalance between Turkey and Europe, in favor of the latter, his prominent option could be to force European countries to change their attitudes toward Turkey in exchange for the safety of their own citizens and stability in their countries. Of course, another tool he openly uses towards the same goal is the refugee deal.

Erdoğan’s remarks just after the terror attack in Britain gives hints. **Terrorism is the weapon of the weak.**\(^\text{100}\) The fragile international actors have an incentive to use terror to impose their demands on the target states, which otherwise could not be forced by conventional ways.\(^\text{101}\) Erdoğan’s incentive for using SADAT, with its terror links, to force European countries to keep silent on Turkey’s slide into authoritarianism has to be deeply investigated. A substantial understanding of the role of SADAT should reveal if Erdoğan had a hand in the terror attacks in Europe.

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ERDOĞAN’S BULWARK AGAINST THE OPPOSITION

Erdoğan’s AKP, a Political Party or Mafia?

“AKP is not a political party, it is the mafia”

“AKP is a mafia organization, which committed crimes”

Arrested Journalist Ahmet Şık

Erdoğan and AKP utilize covert organizations and mafia. They facilitate the connection among the mafia and so-called pro-AKP Humanitarian Organizations. AKP is a part of soccer clubs–mafia relations. Erdoğan’s Government facilitates regulations to weaponize the society and prepare gangs and militia to intervene in a case an election is lost or a mass civilian protest takes place in the country. AKP not only supports the mafia but also employs mafia members at critical positions. For example, the AKP MP and head of AKP’s Youth Organization Abdurrahim Boynukalin is a mafia leader, who organized a violent raid to Hürriyet newspaper on September 2015. Boynukalin has ties with SADAT and is a supporter of İHH, Al Nusra, and Dar–ul İlim.

Figure 15 AKP MP Boynukalin, the one on the left, at the Salafist–Jihadist organization İHH (İnsan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardımcı Vakfı, in English, Human Rights and Freedoms Humanity Aid Charity) press event.
Another Mafia Leader in AKP is İsmail Altınoğlu. Altınoğlu even run as AKP’s candidate for parliamentary elections. Below is his election banner.\footnote{http://odatv.com/tanju-colak-operasyonunda-dikkat-ceken-isimler-1706171200.html} He and his gang members were recently arrested on charges of intimidation, kidnapping, blackmailing, torture, gambling, and armed assault.\footnote{http://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/2017/06/13/tanju-colak-sebekenin-sohret-yuzu}  

![Election Banner]

Figure 16 Top left, Altınoğlu as an AKP parliamentarian candidate. Top right Altınoğlu with Erdoğan and his wife Emine Erdoğan. Bottom left, he carries an automatic rifle with his gang members during 15 July events. Bottom right, he sits with a policeman during the same events.  

Mehmet Aybek is a member of the board of managers of the AKP Youth Organization. Aybek, at his personal page stated with an automatic MP–5 rifle in his hand; \textit{“Tell us, Erdoğan when to kill and when to die”}.\footnote{http://www.abcgazetesi.com/mp5le-tehdit-ettisti-akp-yonetici-gozaltina-alindi-56101h.htm} An MP and Erdoğan opponent Sinan Oğan claimed that Halk Özel Harekat (Public Special Operations) provides weapons training to the people like Aybek.\footnote{http://www.politez.com/detail/politez-/7605/sinan-ogan-akp-sivillere-silah-egitimi-veriyor} Below is also a Public Special Operations vehicle.\footnote{http://www.habermiyiz.com/page/80}
There are multiple mafia gangs, closely affiliated with Erdoğan and AKP politicians. Two prominent examples of these leaders are **Sedat Peker** and **Levent Çiçek**. Peker was a suspect of the Ergenekon trials. Similar to Erdoğan, Sedat Peker’s alias is also ‘the Big Boss’ (Reis). Peker in one of his public speeches in 2015 intimidated Erdoğan’s opponents, stating “we will have them bleed like rivers!” Prior to Constitutional Referendum in April 2017, he intimidated the EU leaders to bring violence to Europe, if their anti–Erdoğan policies continue. Here are his words:

"The ones who look at the life fearlessly do not fear the death. Europeans will learn how our generations, who were grown up with this creed, will bring violence to Europe much more violent than the ‘Gezi Events’ in Turkey. They will learn this definitely when the day comes".

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Peker has ties to SADAT and the groups taking part in the Syrian War. He sent lots of military equipment to these groups.\textsuperscript{119, 120}

Figure 19 Mafia leader Peker promotes his contribution to the Syrian War.

Another prominent mafia leader \textbf{Levent Çiçek} collaborates with \textbf{Osman Gökçek}, the son of AKP’s Ankara Mayor \textbf{Melih Gökçek}.\textsuperscript{121} Çiçek once acted as the director of AKP’s \textbf{Ottoman Hearths Youth Organization}.

Figure 20 Left, Çiçek as the Head of Ottoman Hearths Youth Organization. Right he is in his office and AKP’s Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu’s picture is on the wall.

\textsuperscript{119} http://www.halkibiz.com/m/?id=15328  
\textsuperscript{120} http://www.abcgazetesi.com/sedat-geberden-cihatcilara-muhimmat-3447h.htm  
\textsuperscript{121} http://www.internethaber.com/osman-gokceke-cete-sozu-338530h.htm
It is evident that not only Osman Gökçek but also the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and head of MİT Hakan Fidan also have relations with this mafia leader.

Figure 21 Left, Çiçek on Prime Minister Yıldırım’s right. Right, Çiçek takes part in Head of MİT Fidan’s abandoned election campaign for becoming an AKP MP. Fidan is the one, who smiles in the picture.

**Erdoğan’s Paramilitary Organizations**

Below is a large, but not all–inclusive, list of Erdoğan’s paramilitary organizations.

**SADAT**

SADAT is the most prominent and important paramilitary organization given its relations with other terrorist organizations, its large operational staff of former military specialists, and its support from active duty military specialists. The cooperation between Reis, SADAT and his Salafist–Jihadist paramilitary organizations is a self–fulfilling prophecy. Erdoğan desperately felt a need for a bulwark against a noncompliant Turkish Military as well as potential public movements against his ambitions. SADAT is intentionally designed to prop up Erdoğan until the modernist Turkish military could be changed into a loyalist military. SADAT cadres did their part in the Syrian conflict, proved useful during Erdoğan’s self–coup, and are doing their task in converting a once–powerful secular and pro–democracy military into devout disciples of ‘Erdoğan’s Fake Caliphate’. The useful and dynamic tools provided by SADAT to Erdoğan are explained on the company’s official web page:

122 Of note, during 15 July 2016 events, SADAT, in concert with Turkish Intelligence Agency (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati–MIT) and Turkish Police, largely acted as a hub to plan and coordinate the activities of all organizations on the list.
“SADAT Inc. provides ambush, raid, road closing, destruction, sabotage, and rescue and abduction trainings, in addition to trainings on the defense against such acts, which may be needed by the countries it serves, and organizes the Unconventional War organization of such countries.”

For operational purposes, SADAT was designed to accomplish tasks such as neutralizing military assets using unconventional tactics and confronting any popular protests masquerading as ordinary citizens. What this means is that ‘Ak Youth’ operatives, such as ‘Osmanlı Ocakları’ (Turkish for ‘Ottoman Heaths’), could be converted into paramilitary fighters, such as a ‘People’s Army’, which could counter any opposition against Erdoğan’s aspirations to convert the Turkish political regime into a dictatorship and establish a quasi-caliphate to advance Erdoğan’s hidden agenda.

![Figure 22 Erdoğan and Tanrıverdi meets at an event on 25 January 2014.](image)

Erdoğan’s self-coup on 15 July 2016 was a comprehensive rehearsal of these tasks. Ultimately, what happened during the controversial coup attempt of July 15 are the exact same counter-measures stated in SADAT’s paramilitary tasks, which were employed against the elements of Turkish Military involved in the events of July 15, 2016. After 15 July 2016, Adnan Tanrıverdi was appointed as Erdoğan’s Chief Advisor. He then resigned from his position as the head of SADAT and moved among the members of the SADAT Management Board. His son Ali Kamil Melih Tanrıverdi took over the lead of SADAT. Ali Kamil Melih Tanrıverdi, like his father, is a radical Salafist–Jihadist. For instance, he promotes pro–ISIL sentiments in his BlogSpot, including an introduction of the ISIL book: ‘The Return of Khilafah (Caliphate)’.  

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124 Malsin, J. (July 16, 2016). This Is What Istanbul Was Like As Turkey’s Attempted Coup Played Out. Time.
126 http://akmTanrıverdi.blogspot.de/2014/07/isidin-misyonu.html
Figure 23 left, SADAT’s new chief Ali Kamil Melih Tanrıverdi. Right, he advocates ISIL’s mission and its book titled ‘The Return of Khilafah (Caliphate)’.

TÜGVA Foundation

Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan spreads Salafist–Jihadist sentiments among young Turkish people through his TÜGVA Foundation (Turkey Youth Foundation, in Turkish Türkiye Gençlik Vakfı). Pro–ISIL/Al Nusra religious figure Nurettin Yıldız closely cooperates with Bilal Erdoğan. Yıldız indoctrinates young people at TÜGVA Foundation. Yıldız describes democracy as ‘the affair of infidels’. His book was promoted in a video by Abdullah el Muhaysini, a commander of Jabhat al–Nusra (the name for Al Nusra/Al–Qaida in Syria).

Figure 24 Left, Bilal Erdoğan at a TÜGVA event. Right, Nurettin Yıldız at indoctrinating young TÜGVA members

127 https://plus.google.com/+MelihTanrıverdi
129 Ibid
130 http://www.tugva.org/aksiyon-akademisi-ilk-mezunlarini-verdi/
132 http://gazetemanifesto.com/2017/05/30/el-kaide-seyhi-gerici-nurettin-yildiza-referans-oldu/
Figure 25 Left and right, Nurettin Yıldız talks to young people from Bilal Erdoğan's TÜGVA Foundation. The two posts at Yıldız’s personal page state “we talked about ‘the logic of working for the religion’ and ‘the meaning of today’s young person’ ”

Figure 26 Top left, Nurettin Yıldız. Below left, his visit to Abdullah al Muhaysini, a commander of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Muhaysini later died in a battle. Right, he coaches TÜGVA Foundation’s ‘Action Academy’ youth training event. The banner states “God selected you for Jihad!” Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdoğan also joined the same activity.133

133 http://www.tugva.org/aksiyon-akademisi-ilk-mezunlarini-verdi/
**Sosyal Doku Foundation**

Sosyal Doku (in English Social Texture) is a so-called religious affairs foundation headed by Nurettin Yıldız. As stated above, Yıldız is known with his Salafist–Jihadist ideology and his contacts with Al Nusra (Syrian fraction of Al Qaida) leaders in Syria. He indoctrinates his followers with Salafist–Jihadist sentiments at his foundation.

Figure 27 Left, Yıldız talks to young female followers. Right, his followers protest Israel.

Below is a picture, which frames Nurettin Yıldız with pro–Erdoğan **SADAT advisors** and journalists **Abdurrahman Dilipak** and **Ahmet Varol**. Both Dilipak and Varol write for Erdoğan’s mouthpiece **Yeni Akit Newspaper**.

Figure 28 Yıldız with pro–Erdoğan journalist and SADAT advisor Dilipak. The other pro–Erdoğan journalist and SADAT advisor Ahmet Varol is looking at them from the side of the Turkish Flag.

Below is Nurettin Yıldız with **Yeni Akit Group’s CEO Mustafa Karahasanoğlu**. Dilipak and Varol write for Karahasanoğlu’s Yeni Akit.
In December 2016, a police officer named Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş assassinated Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov. Altıntaş is alleged to be among the followers of Nurettin Yıldız. Altıntaş and his friends had close ties with AKP, Nurettin Yildiz, and thus ISIL and Al Nusra.

Figure 30 Left, Altıntaş chanting Al Nusra creed after the assassination of Andrey Karlov. Center and right, Serkan Özkan, the partner of Altıntaş’s roommate Abdullah Polat, is with AKP’s Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu (in the center) and Erdoğan’s advisor Hamza Yerlikaya (on the right).
Ottoman Hearths

Ottoman Hearths (in Turkish Osmanlı Ocakları) is a pro–Erdoğan youth activist organization, which cements radical views among young Turkish people both in Turkey and in Europe.\(^{142}\) Osmanlı Ocakları is managed by criminals and mafia leaders, including the director Kadir Canpolat. He was one of the six suspects in a failed plot to assassinate Papa 16th Benedictus during his visit to Turkey in November 2006.\(^{143}\)

Osmanlı Ocakları has a strong affiliation with Erdoğan and AKP. It organizes swearing ceremonies for the new members to guarantee their full commitment to Erdoğan. Canpolat recognizes Erdoğan as ‘the most sacred virtue of his organization’ and his organization as ‘Erdoğan’s soldiers’.\(^{144}\) \(^{145}\)

Figure 31 Left, Canpolat and Erdoğan together. Right, Prime Minister Yıldırım, together with Canpolat, at the opening ceremony of the Ottoman Heart cell in Trabzon.

Figure 32 The swearing ceremony for admission of new members to Osmanlı Ocakları. The ceremony serves ultimate loyalty to Erdoğan.\(^{146}\)

\(^{142}\) http://osmanliocaklari.org.tr
\(^{143}\) http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/ergenekon-a-adim-adim-32575.html
\(^{144}\) http://osmanliocaklari.org.tr
\(^{146}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCV5kS2Smd0
Ensar Foundation

Ensar Foundation (in Turkish Ensar Vakfı) is a so-called religious affairs foundation, which has made the headlines many times for the rape and harassment incidents against its female and young male followers. Currently, Erdoğan utilizes Ensar Vakfı to keep the pressure on the 15 July coup courts. Thus, Ensar is intensively involved in the ongoing 15 July trials. Currently, Ensar followers brutally intimidate and insult the lawyers and the families of the 15 July suspects.

![Ensar Vakfı](image)

Figure 33 Left and right, Erdoğan and his son Bilal at different activities of Ensar.

İHH–Human Rights and Freedoms Humanity Aid Charity

İHH (in Turkish İnsan Hakları ve Hürriyetleri İnsanı Yardım Vakfı) is an organization, which carries out so-called humanitarian aid activities. İHH organized and provoked the May 2010 showcase ‘Mavi Marmara Rally to Palestine’, which ended up in a fierce intervention by the Israeli Security Forces. 10 of the onboard activists lost their lives and many wounded due to fatal shots by Israeli Security forces. İHH is headed by Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım. He and his organization allegedly have connections with MİT and facilitate weapons transfer to ISIL and Al Nusra in Syria under the cover of humanitarian aid. The Russian report to UNSC states that İHH and Bülent Yıldırım involved in purchasing weapons for terrorist organizations in the Syrian Arab Republic and this was proven by the discovery of military equipment in trucks ‘delivering humanitarian aid to the refugees’, detained near the Turkish–Syrian border. The report indicates that a considerable number of the foreign fighters in Syria are connected to İHH, thus MİT, SADAT, and Erdoğan.

147 https://www.ihh.org.tr
150 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3u648Eq638
In Russia’s report, İHH’s role in transferring weapons under ‘humanitarian aid’ activities is clearly depicted.

Figure 35 Left, İHH director F. Bülent Yıldırım rallies for a Mavi Marmara protest. Right, Yıldırım at a coordination meeting with Nurettin Yıldız at İHH Headquarters.

Figure 36 Erdoğan, Bülent Yıldırım and Mafia Leader Sedat Peker at the wedding ceremony of the secretary of Erdoğan’s wife.152

İBDA–C Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front

İBDA–C (in Turkish İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları Cephesi) is a Salafist organization, which is accused of plotting the burning of a hotel in Sivas/Turkey in 1993. The event resulted in the loss of 37 lives. İBDA–C is led by Salih İzzet Erdiş, known with his alias ‘Salih Mirzabeyoğlu’. In December 2014 Erdoğan had a private meeting with Mirzabeyoğlu after he was released from 16–year custody. The organization supports ISIL. İBDA–C’s sister organization is ‘Muslim Anatolian Youth’ ( Müslüman Anadolu Gençliği–MAG). Armored İBDA–C/MAG militants were employed during 15 July 2016 events. İBDA–C fights in Syria in Al Nusra and ISIL fronts.

Figure 37 Left, İBDA–C Followers carry a banner promoting their leader. ‘Mahdi’ means ‘the savior of the world’. Right, İBDA–C followers during 15 July events. The person circled appears at the ‘SADAT and paramilitary on 15 July 2016’ section of this book.

Figure 38 Left, Erdoğan and his wife host an İBDA–C jihadist Ghassan Alabed. Center and right Alabed in

Syria with his actual identity.\textsuperscript{158}

**KKT–Stay Brothers Turkey**

KKT (in Turkish Kardeş Kal Türkiye) is a so-called charity organization, led by Orhan Uzuner, the father-in-law of Erdoğan’s son, Bilal. KKT acts as a paramilitary organization, which would mobilize AKP followers in case of a fierce opposition against Erdoğan.\textsuperscript{159, 160} Uzuner recommended the KKT members to carry their weapons in their vehicles, in case there would be a need to use them against anti-Erdoğan people.\textsuperscript{161}

![Figure 39 Erdoğan with Orhan Uzuner at their children’s wedding.](image)

**HÖH–People’s Special Organizations Army**

HÖH (in Turkish Halk Özel Harekat)\textsuperscript{162} is a militia organization founded to protect Erdoğan and AKP against opponents in case of an internal war in Turkey.\textsuperscript{163} It is led by Yunus Emre Polat, who was a militia fighter in Syria.\textsuperscript{164}

![Figure 40 Left, one HÖH vehicle during 15 July events. Center, HÖH Logo on a vehicle. Right, Yunus Emre Polat.](image)

\textsuperscript{158} https://tr.sputniknews.com/ortadogu/201612231026472030-soyal-medya-suryeli-bananin-babasi-cihatci-mi/
\textsuperscript{159} http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/679803/Erdo\d{a}gan_in_milisleri_.html#
\textsuperscript{160} http://odatv.com/gerektigi-zaman-kullanaca\c{c}imiz-silah-var-2002171200.html
\textsuperscript{161} http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/video/video/680816/Erdoğan_in_dunuru_Uzuner___Silahimiz__degil___Sirenimiz_var__d_edim.html
\textsuperscript{162} http://www.halkozelhareketidernegi.org
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid
\textsuperscript{164} http://www.abcgazetesi.com/sinan-ogandan-hoh-aciklamasi-44071h.htm
HÖH promotes a video of an article at its web page. The article claims that Erdoğan will start the ‘final times Islamic Armageddon War in Syria against all infidels’. The video states that Abu Cabir, the leader of Tahrer Sam of Syria (Al Qaida in Syria), is in Turkey to coordinate this war with Erdoğan’s Government.165

İMKAN–DER – Humanitarian Defense and Brotherhood Organization

İMKAN–DER (in Turkish İnsanı Müdafa ve Kardeşlik Derneği) has a strong affiliation with SADAT. It is led by Murat Özer. Russia’s Representative to UN Vitali Curkin reported that İMKAN–DER, İHH, and ONCU NESIL organizations carry weapons to the fighting groups in Syria.166 The organization also provides medical services to Syrian fighters in Gaziantep, Turkey.167 168

Figure 42 Left, İMKAN–DER member with a jihadist, having medical support in Turkey. Right, Bülent Özer with Libyan Jihadists.

Erdoğan’s Self–coup and Turkey’s Depression

The inconsistent and odd explanations in their statements show that, Erdoğan, the Prime Minister Yıldırım, Head of MIT Fidan, some AKP politicians, and pro–Erdoğan military officials, including Major General Zekai Aksakalli, Commander of Special Operations Command, had full awareness about what would happen that day, before the events took place on 15 July 2016. Although there were previous indications of unrest in the Military, Erdoğan and the Government officials deliberately waited until the dissenters took action, instead of taking preventive measures. They even provoked and manipulated the flow of events, and kept them under control. They allowed the uprising to mature and aggravate to a predetermined level before exerting decisive intervention. This resulted in ‘a limited uprising’, controlled by Erdoğan and his collaborators in and out of the Military. This is why Head of the Main Opposition Party–CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu calls the events ‘a controlled coup’ while many former senior Turkish Military officials prefer to call them ‘Erdoğan’s self–coup’. A substantial study on the subject by former state officials is available online.

According to an official declaration by the Turkish Military following 15 July 2016, only 8,651 military personnel involved in the alleged coup attempt (5,761 professional military personnel, 1,676 conscripts, and 1,214 cadets). The Military announced that the number of alleged dissenters formed only 1.5 % of the total manpower of the Turkish Military (a total of 570,111 personnel with 247,196 professionals, 270,970 conscripts, and others). The announcement also stated that a small number of equipment and weapons from the total inventory were employed during the attempt. Namely, 35 military aircraft (including fighter jets and transport aircraft), 37 military helicopters (including 8 attack helicopters), 246 armored vehicles (including 74 tanks), three military ships, and 3992 light weapons were used. In total, the Turkish Military has around 300 fighter jets, 2500 tanks, and hundreds of military helicopters.

Turkey has a Police force of 250,000 policemen and a Gendarmerie force of 270,000 gendarmes. Considering the limited number of 8,651 dissenters versus the total number of these security forces, it is unreasonable to claim that the civilian resistance was needed to suppress the attempt of the dissenters. However, Erdoğan provoked the AKP followers to rally on the streets and confront dissenters, most probably with an intention to increase the death toll. Deliberate delay of intervention by the Government coupled with Erdoğan’s

169 http://theglobepost.com/2017/04/03/opposition-leader-july-15-was-a-controlled-coup/
170 https://15Julyfacts.com/
171 http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tsk-darbe-girisimine-katilan-personel-sayisini-aciklad,ns92udU75k2vw-1OEK4gQ
172 http://www.emekliasubaylar.org/haberler/item/1475-turk-silahlil-kuvvetleri-personel-mevcutlar
invitation to the people to resist the dissenders mainly caused bloody confrontations. Some casualties occurred while the civilians were trying to stop the military armored vehicles. The chaos during the clashes obscured who was shooting whom. The majority of the civilian losses were due to fires from unidentified directions, mostly in forms of sniper shots. The civilians on the streets were sometimes even used by the Police as a shield against the dissenters. Around 250 people lost their lives and more than 1,500 were wounded. Most of the killings took place in Ankara and Istanbul.

Erdoğan’s media has intensively used ‘15 July Martyrs’ and ‘Nation’s great resistance to defend democracy’ rhetoric as well as overt violence and lynch images of alleged dissenters to incite and mold the public opinion against Erdoğan’s opponents, and rationalize the regime’s follow–on brutal crackdown and massive purge. Such rhetoric provided grounds for the declaration of State of Emergency and successive Decree Laws. Furthermore, Erdoğan and his supporters used the self–coup as a pretext for the constitutional referendum on 16 April 2017. Turkish people voted in the referendum to abandon the parliamentary system for an Executive Presidency, minimally curbed by the Parliament. At the end, Erdoğan had the victory through a controversial referendum, tarnished with allegations of fraud. The victory granted Erdoğan the chance to change the country’s regime from a democracy to a dictatorship and establish his 21st–Century Sultanate. He finally managed to turn the century–long democracy march of the Turkish nation into an accelerating dictatorship swirl.

SADAT’s involvement in the 15 July Events

A thorough analysis of the paramilitary organizations, which took part in ‘15 July 2016 events’, clearly indicates that Erdoğan and his team were the orchestrators of the public movements, which resulted in the loss of many civilian lives and lynching and killing of many surrendered soldiers and cadets. Erdoğan utilized proxies like SADAT and other paramilitary organizations to aggravate the chaos and increase the violence. SADAT’s role inside and outside the Military was central and extensive.

A couple of days after 15 July 2016, Nevzat Tarhan, a retired colonel and SADAT’s advisor, stated at HABERTÜRK TV channel that over a thousand pro–Erdoğan ex–military personnel from ASDER were ‘voluntarily on the scene’ that night to render the tanks and the armored vehicles ineffective. Those former military officials were the members of SADAT’s twin organization ASDER (Justice Supporters Union, in Turkish Adaleti

175 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uL9sV-rXTSw
ASDER was founded in 2000 by former military personnel, who were dismissed from the Military in the 1990s for their alleged extremist religious agenda. The founders of SADAT and ASDER are the same people.

The head of SADAT, Tannverdi, was awarded Chief Advisor position to Erdoğan in August 2016. In other words, the head of so-called Islamist Army SADAT was assigned as the Chief Advisor to Erdoğan. One of the focuses of this study is the relationship between SADAT’s role on 15 July 2016 and Tannverdi’s critical assignment at Erdoğan’s palace.

One of the founders of SADAT and ASDER, Tannverdi’s close friend and once AKP’s candidate for the Parliament, Mustafa Hacimustafaoğlu, explained in a TV program that

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176 Tanrıverdi is the honorary president of ASDER and chairman of the board of ASSAM and SADAT
177 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/585597/ SADAT_Saray\_da.html#
ASDER has executed ‘ASDER’s Coup Prevention Plan’ on 15 July 2016. He stated ‘ASDER’s Offensive Intervention Plan’ is also ready if there would be a need in the future. Hacımustafaoğlu’s son Ömer Sefa Hacımustafaoğlu emphasized at the same program that without 15 July Coup purges of tens of thousands of people from the Government departments would never be possible.  

At an interview with pro–Erdoğan newspaper, ‘Milat’ Mustafa Hacımustafaoğlu claimed that “The coup was planned and executed by NATO. The Gulenists were just a tool NATO used for the coup”. He further stated “NATO’s goal with the coup was to smash the idea by Turkey and other 34 Muslim countries for founding ‘the Army of Islam’ because NATO knows that this Army will stop terrorism, spread by imperialists in the region, and bring peace and security to the region... Turkey must exit NATO to eliminate the chances of a future coup... Thanks to the coup we now have the full freedom to cleanse Turkish Military and state departments from the Gulenists... Yet the co–existing threat is the ultra–nationalists, who are trying to fill the gap in the Military after the cleansing.”  

Furthermore head of SADAT Tanrıverdi, on his personal website, states that “NATO, like UN, has become a tool for the U.S. imperialism under Jewish control”.  

A recording of Hacımustafaoğlu’s confrontation with the dissenting soldiers in İstanbul was also aired on the same program. During the recording, he tries to stop the dissenting soldiers with a shocking statement “The commander who gave you these orders has already been killed in Ankara!” The recording took place at around 23:15 on 15 July

Figure 45 Hacımustafaoğlu and his son on a tank on the Bosporus Bridge, where surrendered cadets and conscripts were lynched. His son wears a t–shirt with a sign of Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.

179 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BN9XO2pVbKE
180 http://m.milatgazetesi.com/darbenin-gobeginde-nato-var-haber-95893
182 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BN9XO2pVbKE (time in video 13:50)
2016. The commander, he mentioned, was **Brigadier General Semih Terzi** from Special Operations Command, who was killed by a directive from pro–SADAT **Major General Zekai Aksakallı**. But the killing took place around three hours after Hacimustafaoğlu’s statement! Terzi was a person, who knew too much about Erdoğan’s, MIT’s, SADAT’s and Aksakallı’s ties with ISIL and Al Nusra and confronted illegal activities of this alliance in Syria.

Hacimustafaoğlu, in his speech, further stated that active duty military officers, like **Major Barış Dedeoğlu**, served ASDER’s plan on 15 July. Major Dedeoğlu became famous for his torture to the surrendering officers. After 15 July he resigned and assigned as **The Advisor to Chief Public Safety Department** by AKP Government. These manifestations clearly indicate that on 15 July 2016, pro–SADAT active military personnel were in full coordination with SADAT, ASDER, and paramilitary forces.

![Figure 46 Barış Dedeoğlu insults and intimidates surrendered officers and soldiers with his pistol.](image)

**Mobilization of Erdoğan’s Paramilitary on 15 July 2016**

Mobilization of pro–AKP militias on 15 July 2015 proved successful during Erdoğan’s Self–coup. Pro–AKP militias have conducted additional drills prior to 16 April 2017 Constitutional Referendum to see if they were ready to mobilize when needed.¹⁸³ In other words, Erdoğan is able to use his militia much more efficiently in the future to crush political opponents or to fuel a civil unrest.¹⁸⁴

On 15 July 2016, multiple pro–AKP militia organizations and mafia gangs were on the streets and armed. There are indications that lots of weapons, namely machine guns, and


pistols, were delivered to civilian groups and mafia gangs the Police Headquarters in Ankara. The suspicion remains in the public opinion that those groups and gangs played an important role during Erdoğan’s Self-coup. Their actions have not been investigated or accounted for yet. Recently a farmer, Mustafa Maraş, who killed a person with an MP–5 machine gun, testified that “the Ankara Police gave him the weapon on 15 July 2016 and weapons of such kind were delivered to the civilians during the 15 July events”, Following the reflection on the media, Ankara District Governor confessed that weapons were arbitrarily delivered to the policemen that night without taking any records and some weapons are still missing from the inventory.

That night Erdoğan’s paramilitary force was all over the country. For instance, pro–Erdoğan journalist Fatih Tezcan stated at a TV broadcast that armored İHH militia was employed during 15 July 2016 events. There are serious allegations that pro–AKP militia and mafia groups were responsible for many civilian killings. According to the former Pentagon official Michael Rubin, most of the civilians were shot by pro–AKP militias, who played an important role that night. There are multiple records of pro–AKP militia and mafia groups, who were armed and on the streets in Ankara and İstanbul that night. As mentioned earlier, these groups comprised of SADAT, Osmanlı Ocakları, İHH, and other organizations, which have a standing mandate to intervene in a case of any civic or military opposition against Erdoğan’s regime.

Many organized criminals and mafia groups were armed on the streets. They provoked civilians and soldiers. For instance, Levent Çiček, a well–known mafia leader from Ankara is shown below in a photo taken during the events. Çiček is a very close friend of AKP politicians, including the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Ankara Major Melih Göçek’s son Osman Göçek. He once acted as the director of AKP’s Ottoman Hearths Youth Organization.

186 https://www.evrensel.net/haber/291606/siviller-silahlandirdi-mi
189 http://15temmuzhareketi.org/2016/08/12/o-cege-sivil-kiyafetli-sivili-olum-sacti/
190 http://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/iste-akpinin-silahli-sivilleri-170610
195 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqOTY7uNDYy
199 https://www.evrensel.net/haber/291606/siviller-silahlandirdi-mi
203 http://15temmuzhareketi.org/2016/08/12/o-cege-sivil-kiyafetli-sivili-olum-sacti/
Figure 47 A mafia gang, led by Levent Çiçek (fourth from the left), is armed and on the street on 15 July 2016.

The pro–Erdoğan Twitter troll ‘BASKENTÇI’ confessed in a tweet that the followers of pro–ISIL, pro–Al Nusra Nurettin Yıldız took part in the events.206

![Twitter tweet]

Figure 48 Pro–Erdoğan Twitter troll ‘BASKENÇI’ states that Yıldız’s followers recovered the TV channel CNN Turk on the night of 15 July.

Even pro–Erdoğan newspaper ‘Yeni Şafak’ reported armed militia’s intervention to the events. An eyewitness Tuncay Doğan from Aksaray, İstanbul reported; “A civilian vehicle arrived at a square (in Aksaray, İstanbul). Civilians with long hair and dirty beards came out of the vehicle, carrying long barreled guns. They told to the public ‘The curfew is in effect. Go to your homes. We will not let you come to the squares’. These people spread into the streets and told to each other that ‘the streets and the squares must be blocked’. They shot at civilians during the events”.207

206 http://www.habermiz.com/page/88
207 http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/o-gece-sivil-kiyafetliler-olum-sacti-2509790
Figure 49 Tuncay Doğan reports his observations to pro–Erdoğan newspaper ‘Yeni Şafak’.

Figure 50 Top left, Pro–Erdoğan Salafist paramilitary IBDA–C’s Muslim Anatolian Youth leader Mehmet Ali Bayram is seen on 15 July 2016. The text in the red rectangle says: “We the Anatolian Muslim Youth came to help soldiers and police, who defend God’s religion and our country against Secularists, Kemalists, and Gülenists”. Top right, IBDA–C leader Bayram with the so–called Jihadist Commander, but in fact a morally corrupt figure208 Ömer Halid in Syria. Halid is supported by AKP and MIT. He holds the book of Mirzabeyoğlu, IBDA–C’s leader.209 Bottom left, same IBDA–C militia hunting dissenters upon a call from police! Bottom center, he is in Syria with Ömer Halid. Bottom right, he seems well trained and armed.

208 http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/chatcilar-birbirine-dustu-116619.html
Who Killed Civilians?

No official ballistics or criminal reports on how, when and where the civilian casualties took place have been shared with the public. There are serious claims, backed by substantial evidence, that some civilian casualties were caused by the orchestrated actions, supervised by the masterminds of the Self–coup. The shotguns used in civilian killings could easily be identified by ballistics investigations, autopsies or criminal investigations. There seems to be no appetite for an inquiry by the Government and pro–Erdoğan prosecutors and courts deliberately lack the diligence to do it.

For a long time after the events, Pro–Erdoğan media has deliberately broadcasted a story about a dissenting sniper, who, on 15 July 2016, allegedly positioned himself on top of a column of the Bosphorus Bridge, targeted pro–Erdoğan civilians and killed many people till morning.\(^\text{210}\)\(^\text{211}\) The sniper’s identity is yet unknown. According to the court indictment, 32 civilians, 7 military personnel, and 2 policemen lost their lives during the events. Right after the events, vast media reported eyewitness accounts, who stated that most of the killings were due to sniper shots. For months, Erdoğan’s media reported the identities of all critical dissenters, but they did not publish any report about this mysterious sniper. After a long period of speculation and propaganda by pro–Erdoğan media, İstanbul Police Chief Mustafa Çalışkan stated at the Parliamentary Commission for Coup Investigation that “\textit{there were no snipers on the tower of the Bosphorus Bridge. It was only a myth}”.\(^\text{212}\) Consequently, pro–Erdoğan media let the speculation vanish by the time. Recently released court indictment stated that a crank on top of the bridge was confused to be a sniper during the events.\(^\text{213}\)\(^\text{214}\)

Figure 51 Pro–Erdoğan media used this photo for months to report about a dissenting sniper on top of the tower of the Bosphorus Bridge.

Were snipers only a myth?

There are multiple eyewitness records about ‘snipers in black vans/midi buses or on top of buildings/hills’, who opened fire on the civilian people and killed many. The records prove that there were multiple snipers at several locations in İstanbul, who killed many civilians. For instance, pro–ERDOĞAN eyewitnesses of the Bosphorus Bridge events stated on a TV that the soldiers did not shoot at them, but the one, who was taking the fatal shots, was a sniper. They said they could not see the sniper’s location and where the shots are fired from! When one watches the video of the events he or she could easily discern sniper shots amidst intensive automatic rifle shots.215 Another young eyewitness spoke to a pro–Erdoğan TV channel and swore that fatal shootings on the civilian people on the Bosphorus Bridge were not from the soldiers, who were blocking the bridge, but from two people dressed in police uniforms, who were with a mini cooper type van at another direction.

Figure 52 Top left, a pro–Erdoğan young person swears that not the soldiers on the Bridge but two people in police uniforms fatally shot at the civilians from another direction.216 Top right, another eyewitness at the Bridge says the snipers fatally shot at the people, who were trying to help the wounded and the ambulances at the scene.217 Bottom, the eyewitness at the Bosphorus Bridge tells the fatal shots were from a sniper they cannot spot.218

215 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz0kziyTlZo (video time 0:40)
216 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FiOJoajar2Y (video time 06:50)
217 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2WNTvGrls0 (video time 00:47)
218 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dz0kziyTlZo (video time 06:50)
Once Erdoğan’s election and publicity coordinator Erol Olçok and his son Abdullah Tayyip Olçok were among the civilians, who were killed by sniper shots at the Bosphorus Bridge. Olçok and his son came to the Bridge early and participated in the protests, when the events started. Olçok’s wife Nihal Olçok, at a TV program, explained in detail how his husband and son were targeted and killed by the sniper. She told the sniper definitely knew their identities in advance.

Snipers were not reported only at the Bosphorus Bridge but at several locations in İstanbul. Pro–Erdoğan eyewitnesses, who went to İstanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa İstanbul) building at İstinye, İstanbul, stated that there were two snipers on top of the building. For instance, Müslüm Ergin, who was wounded near İstanbul Stock Exchange, stated in an interview that there were two snipers on top of the building. Ali Usta and his wife Jale Usta stated that they were wounded by sniper shots from the top of the building. The head of the Stock Exchange Himmet Karadağ confirmed the sniper reports at an interview. At another instance in Acıbadem, İstanbul, Hasan Girgin was wounded and his friend was Fazıl Demir killed by a sniper according to Girgin’s testimony at the court.

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219 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wh1Zz-ILmMk (video time 43:11)
221 http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/is-yasam/haber/1275024-bomba-ihbari-var-deyip-borsa-istanbula-girmisler
223 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnEvLRbfk4E (video time 01:00)
224 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHr9GT4LeYA (video time 01:50)
Snipers were also spotted at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul. One pro–AKP woman explained at a pro–Erdoğan TV interview that his son was shot by snipers in a black van at Atatürk Airport shortly before the arrival of Erdoğan’s plane.225 She stated the snipers were in a Ford Transit type van.

![Figure 55 Left, Muteber Ayabak explains at a pro–Erdoğan TV channel that his pro–Erdoğan son Mahir Ayabak (in the center) was shot dead by snipers in a black van on 15 July 2016. Right, a midi van (transporter), which was used to kidnap a person in Ankara on 21 December 2016.](image)

In fact, the suspicious events with blacks vans have continued after 15 July 2016. Until now, thirteen people have been reported to be kidnapped in Ankara with mysterious black vans within the last several months. All kidnapped persons were purged government officials.226 227 228 Although the black vans and their plates were identified, the Government and the Police did not act upon these grave incidents.229 Likewise, Erdoğan, AKP and their collaborators in the Judiciary and the Police deliberately cover numerous civilian killings due to sniper shots and do not allow any investigation on the issue. The reason is simple. Any serious investigation will reveal Erdoğan’s and SADAT’s relations with the snipers and their actual role during the events.

**Who Lynched Cadets and Soldiers?**

On the night of 15 July 2016, many conscript soldiers and cadets were tasked against, what they were told as, wide–scale terror activities in İstanbul and Ankara. The ones on the Bosporus Bridge, like the others throughout the country, all surrendered early the next morning. After the soldiers surrendered to the police, the militia groups attacked them. They were beaten, smashed with sharp objects and bats. Two cadets, Murat Tekin and Ragip Enes Katran from Turkish Air Force Academy–Istanbul and four military personnel were among the surrendered. They were unfortunately stabbed to death, strangled and their

225 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaBTZnyurJ8 (video time 16:13)
228 http://odatv.com/7-kisi-kacirildi-2504171200.html
229 http://magduriyetler.com/2017/04/20/ankarada-kacirilan-7-kisiyle-ilgili-sok-goruntuler/
throats were slit. Some of them were even beheaded by knives, resembling ISIL’s brutal executions.\(^{230}\) The attackers even tried to lynch a journalist, who tried to take photos of the lynching.\(^{232}\) Murderers yet remain unknown. The lynching took place in front of Police officers. Some police officers tried to stop the lynching and called extra support from the Istanbul Police Administration. The support, which was essential for a decisive intervention, was deliberately never sent. As of today, no criminal investigation concerning these lynches has been initiated.\(^{232}\) \(^{233}\) \(^{234}\) \(^{235}\) \(^{236}\) \(^{237}\) \(^{238}\) \(^{239}\) \(^{240}\) \(^{241}\) \(^{242}\) \(^{243}\) (Caution: extremely disturbing video content!).

Yet there is no judiciary investigation because Erdoğan and the AKP Government deliberately prevent any official inquiry over the lynching and these murders. The reason is simple. If an inquiry starts it will most probably end up with links with Erdoğan, AKP, and SADAT. The people, who lynched cadets and soldiers on the Bosporus Bridge, most probably have ties with Nurettin Yıldız, SADAT, extremely racist organizations or mafia gangs.\(^{244}\) \(^{245}\)

Figure 56 Lynched cadets Murat Tekin and Ragıp Enes Katran

\(^{231}\) http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/family-of-the-soldier-lynched-at-bosporus-bridge-he-was-smashed-with-bats-131662.html
\(^{234}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQnDQUVaTwY
\(^{235}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_10rJRq1Rs
\(^{236}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSdHTXyYbDQ
\(^{237}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9UTxCOV21Q
\(^{238}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRnHgLgaNAQ
\(^{239}\) http://www.yaziyor.tv/erleri-linc-edilenler-de-nurettin-yildizin-tarikatindan-iddiasi/
\(^{242}\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-0GGCPpXGs
\(^{243}\) http://odatv.com/vid_video.php?id=8E603
\(^{244}\) http://www.turkeytoday.net/kim-bu-nurettin-yildizin-adamlari-turk-askerini-bogazlar-gazeteci-dover-elci-katlederler/
Figure 57 Pro–Erdoğan paramilitary Lynches cadets and soldiers on the Bosporus Bridge on 16 July 2016. The faces of the victims are deliberately obscured.
Pro–Erdoğan media and people shared felonious comments about the lynching.

Figure 58 Top left, pro–Erdoğan ‘Yeni Akit’ states: “The people beheaded the coupists!” Top right, User sonçosmanlı ῆv*[^1] h @delliadam_ who was at the Bridge during the events, writes on Twitter: “The dirt has been sent to its deserved place” Bottom left, his friend at the moment asks: “What’s your job there?” he replies: “My task is beheading!” Bottom right, same person as a response to a person, who opposes his statements, writes: “Would you like to see the soldier’s torn apart brain?” He has a ring with an old Turkic symbol, used by some extremely racist people in Turkey. This person’s active address: https://twitter.com/sonosmanlı34_/media

At another instance, Mehmet Fatih Demirci, who took part at the lynching, was later identified in an activity of AKP’s ‘Anatolian Student Union’, lecturing young AKP followers. Demirci was also identified as a speaker at ‘Strategic Thought Group of Mustafa Kemal University (MKU)’, Hatay, with a theme of ‘A look at global politics’ on 07 December 2016.[^246][^247] He is the Chairman of MFD Energy Industry and Trade Limited Company (MFD

[^246]: https://www.facebook.com/events/926353474132885/
[^247]: https://www.facebook.com/mkusdt/posts/652302968284983
Energy Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi). His pro–Erdoğan twitter addresses are @MFatihDemirci and @MFD_44 (alias). Demirci is affiliated with İHH.248

Figure 59 Top left 1 and 2 Demirci participates at the Lynch. Top right 1, he speaks at AKP’s ‘Anatolian Student Union’. Top right 2, he participates at an İHH event for Syrian children.249 Bottom left and center, he speaks at MKU University in Hatay province of Turkey on 07 December 2016. Bottom right; although he is a businessman, representing ‘Muslims at the University’ organization, he makes a media announcement in front of Iranian Consulate in Istanbul on 14 December 2016 to protest Aleppo events.250

AKP’s ‘Anatolian Student Union’ frequently hosts leading AKP politicians as lecturers.

Figure 60 Leading AKP figures with the Anatolian Student Union. Left to right: Yalçın Akdoğan, Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, and Erdoğan with the Union’s representatives during their visit.

Some attackers were individuals from outside Turkey. They are alleged to work for Al Nusra, and thus for SADAT. Head of İHH Bülent Yıldırım confessed at a speech that foreign militia was employed during the events.

Figure 61 Left, foreign militia, most probably affiliated with Al Nusra attack a Turkish soldier! Right, Yıldırım explains how foreign fighters were employed on 15 July 2016.

Impact of Sadat on Turkish Military

After his self-coup in July 2016, Erdoğan initiated a massive purge in state institutions and in the Military. He purged more than 150,000 state officials at various levels and directed arrests of 50,000 people. The purges and arrests were only possible with the extraordinary authorities provided by the declaration of State of Emergency, which was later extended multiple times, and a strand of constitutionally illegal Emergency Decrees. In fact, Emergency Decree Laws bypassed the Turkish Parliament’s scrutiny. Erdoğan took advantage of the circumstances and steered the Military into shallow waters by purging almost two-thirds of the generals, 90% of staff officers, thousands of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and other personnel without due process or investigation. Up to now, around 10,000 military officials, around 200 generals/admirals, and 16,500 military cadets were purged. With the help of SADAT’s devotees in the Military, Erdoğan targeted the elite cadre of the Turkish Military. He eliminated almost all mid-level generals, nearly all career officers, and huge numbers of other officers, NCOs, and even privates. Even the very young cadets, still at their early ages, were sacked from the military schools. Although the number of the purged personnel may seem a relatively small fraction of an almost 600,000 man–powered Military, in fact, the Military has lost its most skilled and trained leaders and staff. Decades of experience and knowledge have been lost. Now, the once mighty war machine is suffocating under unprecedented purges, arrests and incessant smear campaigns run by Erdoğan’s propaganda machine.

Tannverdi, in a statement in 2010, said: “The Turkish Military should, must and will be changed”. Tannverdi then proposed that AKP’s Deputy Prime Ministers, Foreign, Interior and Justice Ministers should be members of the Supreme Military Council, which decides for the top cadre of the Military. He also advocated that Turkish General Staff should be downgraded to advisory level, the Land, Air, and Maritime services should directly be subordinated to the Minister of Defense, and the Gendarmerie should be detached from the Military. All of his recommendations came into effect with Emergency Decree Laws since 15 July 2016. Erdoğan changed the composition of the Supreme Military Council and the chain of command of the Military by assigning service branches under the Defense Ministry and allocating Gendarmerie under the Minister of Interior. Erdoğan also targeted the core of military by shutting down all military high schools and by changing the structure of the military education institutions, academies, and war colleges. He drastically changed the structure of the Military, rendering the organization practically ineffective.
It seems easy for Erdoğan to fill up the gap of the purged personnel while all scavengers are hovering on top. The process is underway to build a **new Military of Erdoğan loyalists** at the expense of undermining the second largest Military in NATO. Those with radical tendencies, who did not have a chance to promote before 15 July 2016, are now able to come to the critical positions and ranks within the Turkish Military. Thus SADAT loyalists are filling the personnel vacuum caused by the ongoing massive purge.\(^{259}\) Tanrıverdi claims that with the new ‘**competent officers**’, the Military would be even stronger.\(^{260}\)

Tanrıverdi’s position as Erdoğan’s Chief Advisor renders him the ability to influence the recruitment policy of NATO’s second largest Military.\(^{261}\) Targeting the Military’s DNA, Erdoğan crafted executive orders to vest SADAT operatives with the task of recruiting for his new Military. In accordance with the Decree Law dated 31 October 2016, pro–SADAT retired officers and NCOs are tasked in the recruitment of military personnel and cadets to the Turkish Military.\(^{262}\) This critical change effectively defers the entire personnel policy of the Military to SADAT. Tanrıverdi now has the opportunity to use his ex–military workforce to help ‘SADAT qualified candidates’ join the Military. For instance, AKP and SADAT, after 15 July 2016, rushed the recruitment of officers for Special Operations Command, which is commanded by **Lieutenant General Zekai Aksakallı**.\(^{263}\)\(^{264}\) Aksakallı was Erdoğan’s infiltrator and provocateur in the Military during the self–coup.\(^{265}\)

![Figure 62](https://example.com/aksakalli.png)

**Figure 62** Aksakallı shakes hands with a Free Syrian Army fighter in Syria.

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\(^{258}\) Of note, in contemporary law, emergency decree law in principle should be related to the emergency situation and long-term structural changes normally are not to be expected. In practice, when the state of emergency ends decree laws should become ineffective. However, Erdoğan and AKP are manipulating them for substantial structural change in the state system and in the re-organization of the Military.


\(^{262}\) Ibid


\(^{265}\) [https://www.aei.org/publication/turkish-officers-speak-erdogan-may-have-staged-coup/](https://www.aei.org/publication/turkish-officers-speak-erdogan-may-have-staged-coup/)
The Turkish Military is going through one of the most difficult times in its history. NATO's second largest Military is now facing a significant change in its structure and culture. The impact is disastrous. Command and control effectiveness is only a mirage. Organizational planning and coordination capabilities are undermined. High–tech equipment, including fighter aircraft, is well short on operators, especially competent, skilled and experienced ones. Mass dismissals after 15 July 2016 induced widespread anxiety inside the Turkish Military. Talking about morale is a futile attempt. One of the biggest dangers for the Turkish Military is that it becomes highly politicized and interest groups inside are now trying to occupy cornerstones as much as they can.
SADAT: Guardian of the Second Turkish Revolution

SADAT can be appropriately compared with the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the ‘Pasdaran’ (Persian for ‘Guards’). Such a comparison may provide the potential trajectories for SADAT’s involvement in Turkish politics, as well as its own institutional evolution. It’s worth to note that the IRGC is a full–fledged organization that has evolved for almost four decades since the Iranian Revolution, whereas SADAT is just a fledgling institution, which seems to be following the footsteps of its Iranian counterpart in many respects. This time gap between the two should be taken into account throughout the following analysis.

Figure 63 The IRGC commanders in a meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (from Islamic Republic News Agency).

To begin with, the Iranian Revolution (aka the Islamic Revolution or the 1979 Revolution) was the overthrow of Western–backed Shah dynasty and its replacement with an Islamic republic under the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. During the Revolution, the IRGC was established as an umbrella organization, uniting a number of pro–Khomeini groups and
militias. Putting these various groups together under Khomeini’s banner, the IRGC stood out as the central body with a task of stamping out dissident currents within the revolutionary movement. It was mainly structured as a counterweight to the regular military in order to bulwark the revolution against a possible coup. Enshrined in the Iranian law, the IRGC is defined as “an institution commanded by the Supreme Leader whose purpose is to protect the Islamic Revolution of Iran and its accomplishments, while striving continuously...to spread the sovereignty of God’s law.” Today, the IRGC has become a deeply entrenched and multidimensional institution, functioning as a vast socio–political–economic conglomerate, whose influence prevails in every part of Iranian political life and society. Members within the Iranian political system at all ranks from the president to local administrators come from the IRGC. The Guards run a huge apparatus of resources in media, education, economy, and security.

In the security domain, in particular, the IRGC consists of two main operative bodies: ‘The Quds Force’ and ‘The Basij Militia’. The Quds Force specializes in foreign missions, providing training, funding, and weapons to extremist groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iraqi insurgents. The Basij, which literally means ‘Mobilization’, is a paramilitary group tasked with providing popular support for the Iranian regime through mobilizing ordinary volunteers against domestic anti–regime movements by means of street violence and intimidation.

The Comparison

Erdoğan, notably after the very evidential 2013 corruption scandal, which involved him, his son, and several key people around him, developed paranoia about the possibility of an obligation to step down from his reign. He gradually took many steps to hammer the democratic developments in the recent Turkish political life and turn the direction of the country into a revolutionary wrap by drawing a line between the legacies of the Old and the New Turkey. Following the 15 July 2016 events, Erdoğan’s paranoia grew even bigger and he started to openly criticize the Western leaders, especially the United States and the European Union, for not backing him after his self–coup. Capped by the “coup” on 15 July 2016, he intensified his efforts to portray his vision of the “New Turkey”, rising out of the ashes of the Old Turkey, mainly structured around the Western–backed secular establishment.

Prior to the April 2016 constitutional referendum in Turkey, Erdoğan used the diplomatic

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rows with Netherlands as well as in different European countries, as pretexts to fuel more hostility toward the West while rallying support amongst his own constituency.\textsuperscript{270} Such anti-Western sentiments are very similar to the atmosphere during and after the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Nevertheless, whether Erdoğan’s New Turkey and Iran’s 1979 Revolution are analogous to one another is still open to further discussion, which is not the focus in this analysis. What is more central to this piece is the inquiry whether SADAT’s role and mentality during and after the self–coup bears a resemblance to those of the IRGC during and after the revolution in Iran. From an organizational standpoint, SADAT has some marked similarities to the IRGC.

On 15 July 2016, SADAT immediately mobilized pro–Erdoğan paramilitary groups as soon as the tanks started to roll in the streets at the beginning of the self–coup. These groups comprised paramilitary forces like Osmanlı Ocakları, whose members received unconventional warfare tactics from SADAT against formal troops.\textsuperscript{271} These militias disguised as ordinary citizens in the crowds, neutralized 60–ton battle tanks, and led people to act against the troops\textsuperscript{272}. For countervailing against the revolting factions of the regular army, SADAT played a crucial role in favor of Erdoğan’s rule through its own operatives as well as the Ak Youth militias. In this sense, such an organizational and operational structure is very much reminiscent of Basij militias within the IRGC. Basij militias played a similar role in Iran crushing the massive demonstrations to contest the re–election of then–President Ahmadinejad in 2009.\textsuperscript{273}

SADAT, with the support of Turkish Intelligence (aka MĠT), serves as an agent for foreign missions, which is similar to the Quds Force in the IRGC. In parallel to what the Iranian counterpart has been doing for decades by creating own proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, SADAT has been working with the radical groups within the Syrian insurgents, including al–Nusra Front, Ahrar ash–Sham & Jaysh al–Islam and also the extremist groups in Libya, linked to al–Qaeda and ISIL.\textsuperscript{274} SADAT’s operations are supported by some Turkish NGOs, including İmkan–Der and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). Both organizations are the staunch supporters of Erdoğan.

Historically, much of Pasdaran’s prominence came with the Iran–Iraq War that took place right after the Revolution. It has become a process in which the IRGC consolidated its domestic stance, and, more importantly, marginalized the regular forces.\textsuperscript{275} The cadres hailing from Shah Period were considerably eliminated during the war. In a similar way, Erdoğan, without declaring an ultimate goal, decided to intervene in Syria right after the self–coup despite the unfavorable circumstances for the Turkish involvement in the conflict. Interestingly, a group of soldiers who seemed to actively participate in the coup events was

\textsuperscript{270} \url{https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/turkey-summons-dutch-envoy-over-riot-police-tactics-in-rotterdam}

\textsuperscript{271} \url{http://www.aei.org/publication/has-sadat-become-erdogans-revolutionary-guards/}

\textsuperscript{272} \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uL9sV-rXT5w}

\textsuperscript{273} \url{http://www.aei.org/publication/has-sadat-become-erdogans-revolutionary-guards/}

\textsuperscript{274} \url{http://www.aei.org/publication/has-sadat-become-erdogans-revolutionary-guards/}

sent to the battlefield, which was noticed during the 15 July trials in their absence.276

All of these suggest that SADAT, in the case of Turkey, has many similarities to the IRGC in Iran, especially in functioning as a guardian for the regime. After all, this analysis underscores that the main motivation behind the leaders of Iranian Revolution and Erdoğan is common: to protect their regimes from the opposition in the form of dissident people and non-loyal armies. In Iran, the panacea was devised and developed as an organization named IRGC. There are strong signs that Erdoğan and AKP are following the same footsteps by putting flesh on the bones of SADAT.

What the future holds for SADAT remains to be seen. For comparison with the IRGC down the road, the alarming juncture for SADAT’s prospective trajectory would be whether its influence in Turkey will be expanding to the other realms, particularly economic and social life. If so, a Turkish version of IRGC is more likely to arrive at the domestic and international theater. The United States already designated the IRGC as a ‘human rights abuser’ in 2011 and debates are still underway in the US whether to designate the Guards as a terrorist organization. SADAT, on the same track with IRGC, may be a candidate for such designations on the international stage as the organization breaches international law by supporting radical terrorist groups abroad and violating human rights within the country.

CONCLUSION

SADAT is a very profitable apparatus for Erdoğan to pursue his hidden agenda and fight his enemies in his quest for total power. Serious evidence indicates that SADAT, as an unsupervised, uncontrolled, unaudited special war entity,277 provided weapons and counter–guerrilla training to ISIL, Al Nusra and some other extremist groups in the region. Russia’s letter to United Nations Security Council, dated 01 February 2016, further shows Erdoğan’s ties with ISIL.278 279 280 The coincidence of Erdoğan’s threatening calls to European countries with the explosions in Europe increases the suspicion for the links between Erdoğan and ISIL and other extremist groups in Syria, Libya and Europe.281

SADAT played a major role during and after Erdoğan’s self–coup on 15 July 2016. SADAT and pro–AKP militia are accused of slaying civilians and brutally slaughtering surrendered conscript soldiers and military cadets to aggravate the situation and increase the chaos. Deliberate prevention of due judicial processes by Erdoğan and his Government implies that many casualties resulted from SADAT’s orchestrated actions supervised by the masterminds of the self–coup. Similar to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, SADAT evolves to become Erdoğan’s revolutionary guard for establishing e new regime in the country. Tanrverdi’s appointment as Erdoğan’s Chief Advisor after 15 July 2016 paved the way for a swift reorganization of the state and the Military. Tanrverdi’s ideas for restructuring the Military and the state institutions were realized by the emergency decree laws and the amendments to the constitution in April 2017. SADAT operatives are now authorized for the recruitment in the Turkish military.

Erdoğan seems much determined to do whatever it takes to hold on to his power at the expense of sliding Turkey into an authoritarian state. His rhetoric, behaviors, and fraud in April 2017 constitutional referendum indicate that the chance for a peaceful transition of power from his rule is very slim. Erdoğan gradually turned his paramilitary organizations into the tools for suppressing the dissidents inside and outside the country.282 As SADAT’s effectiveness was specifically proven tested on 15 July 2016, Erdoğan would not hesitate to use this tool in the future when he deems necessary, to shape the domestic politics, crush the opposition, and fuel a civilian unrest.283

279 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aydoaean-vatanda/russian-letter-to-unsc-cl_b_9502784.html
280 http://www.voltairenet.org/article191990.html
282 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ turkey-military-president-erdogan-armed-forces-hair-beards-headscarves-a7614811.html
Erdoğan’s path is not only dangerous for Turkey but also for the region, the Middle East, and Europe. For the democracy to prevail in Turkey again, Erdoğan must be stopped. Erdoğan is pulling the nation, the country, and the region towards a cliff, where the chance of a hard fall is immense. The Turkish people should not close their eyes to the harsh reality. They must act immediately and resolutely to stop Erdoğan and revert the country back to democracy. The international community, including UN, NATO and EU should do their part to prevent this 21st Century Dictator drastically degrading international peace and stability.
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